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Abstract 
 
The focus of this paper is on the trade-off between cost efficiency and access in the choice of the optimal 
mix of public and private provision in universal health systems. We model a simple health care market in 
which the regulator acts as a third payer. Patients need one unit of medical service and differ in the 
severity of illness. A private and a public hospital are available. The private manager internalizes profits, 
and has an incentive both to refuse to treat costly patients and to exert effort in cost reduction. The public 
manager does not internalize profits, and has no incentive to reduce costs or to dump costly patients. We 
show that, when a relatively efficient effort in cost reduction is available, it is optimal to buy part of the 
services from the private hospital. This may be the case for procedures that are easier to standardize, such 
as elective surgery. Since the regulator acts as an insurer for the whole population, a public hospital has to 
be used as a last resort facility. Imposing a no-dumping constraint on the private hospital is not always 
optimal since eliciting effort and truthful revelation of costs may become more difficult. 
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1 Introduction
In universal health care systems, the government acts as a third payer for medical services. These services
are delivered by a mix of public and private providers. In the last twenty years, procurement arrangements
with private hospitals have increased in many industrialized countries, such as Italy, France and the UK.
In these systems, there is a range of services that are provided by both public and private hospitals. This
trend seems to be motivated more by ideological factors than by strong theoretical and empirical results on
the optimal mix of delivery. It is usually claimed that private hospitals are more efficient because they face
different costs and are more flexible regarding their personnel. Private managers may also be more sensitive
to financial incentives since they internalize profits.1 If this was indeed true, what is the rationale for keeping
some public capacity, as many countries do? The answer is that efficiency is not the only dimension to
evaluate health services delivery. In many countries governments have to ensure universal health coverage;
this target has been put forward to justify the role of public hospitals.2 Profit driven private hospitals might
reject patients whose cost exceeds the reimbursement from the government.3 Dumping is the result of a
regulation failure: unobservability or contract incompleteness make it impossible to adapt the price to the
severity of illness of each patient, within a certain diagnostic group. If such a problem is severe, the regulator
might prefer to use public hospitals, where access can be ensured. In many countries, public providers act as
last resort, and are considered as safety nets for the poorest and sickest.
The focus of this paper is on the trade-off between cost efficiency and access to care in the choice of the
optimal mix of public and private provision. We model a simple health care market where the government
acts as a third payer and can contract with a public and a private hospital. A crucial assumption is that all
patients are entitled to get the treatment for free. All patients benefit from the treatment in the same way,
but differ in the severity of illness and thus in the cost of treatment. Because of contract incompleteness,
1 The higher efficiency of private hospitals has yet to be shown empirically. For instance, Burgess and Wilson (1996), find
contradicting results on the impact of ownership on efficiency and results depend on the measure of technical inefficiency used.
Zuckerman et al. (1994) use US data and Chang et al. (2004) use Taiwan data. They both find that public hospitals are more
inefficient than private ones.
2 In France, the role of the private sector in the provision of publicly funded health services was enhanced by the “Bachelot
Law”, introduced in 2009. Critics of the law feared that the use of private hospitals would reduce the access to care.
3 The WHO, discussing the role of the private sector in European health systems, advocates the implementation of regulation
restricting“individual entrepreneurial behavior so as to protect core societal objectives in such areas as public health and safety,
access, social cohesion and quality of care.” (WHO, 2002, p.8.)
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ex ante reimbursements cannot depend on cost realizations and the regulator is constrained to use a unitary
price, and a fixed remuneration for the public manager. Both the public and the private manager can choose
whether to treat patients and can exert effort to reduce variable costs. The incentives faced by the managers,
however, depend on the ownership of the hospital. The private manager internalizes profits, and has an
incentive both to turn down costly patients and to exert effort in cost reduction. The public manager does
not internalize profits, which are appropriated by the the regulator, and has no incentive to reduce costs or
to dump costly patients. Since she is the owner, the regulator can also control the waiting time of the public
hospital.
We show that it is optimal to use the public hospital as a last resort provider; the regulator buys a share
of services from the private hospital if and only if managerial effort leads to high reductions in costs. This
result is rather intuitive. Since all patients have to be treated, it is impossible to distort quantities in order to
provide incentives to the last resort hospital. The public hospital, which does not dump patients, is the most
suited to play this role. Because of the presence of a last resort hospital, it is possible for the regulator to be
tough with the private hospital. Eliciting effort from the private manager is less costly for the regulator the
higher the efficiency of managerial effort. The model predicts that mixed delivery is optimal for procedures
such as elective surgery: in this case an efficient management of the operating rooms might be sufficient
to obtain considerable cost reductions. Procedures with smaller margins for cost reductions (for instance,
medical ones) should be provided entirely by public hospitals.
The second contribution of the paper is to look at the role of dumping. If the regulator can forbid the
private hospital to dump patients, the private manager has to report the cost realization and has to treat
all patients as long as profits are non-negative. If the potential reduction in costs due to managerial effort
is high, this no-dumping constraint is effective in reducing the cost of provision. If the reduction is small,
conversely, the hospital has incentives to misreport costs in order to dump some patients. No reduction
in total government expenditures is expected from contracting with the private hospital. Thus, forbidding
dumping is not always beneficial from a welfare prospective. This result stems from the trad-off between
efficiency and access, and to our knowledge, is novel in the literature.
There is a prolific literature dealing with dumping in the health care sector. As mentioned above, prospec-
tive reimbursement schemes may lead to undesired refusal of patients. Ma (1994), Ellis(1997), and Chalkley
and Malcomson (2002), among others, show that a mixed cost reimbursement enhances social welfare even
though it lowers the power of incentives in cost reduction. We take a different perspective. We do not look
at the optimal remuneration scheme, and limit the analysis to the case in which the regulator has only one
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instrument, the price, because it is impossible to condition the reimbursement on the realization of costs.
This assumption is reasonable since the costs of health services may be non verifiable (even ex post) and
difficult to be contracted upon. In addition, in most industrialized countries, health care systems shifted to
prospective remuneration schemes based on diagnostic groups.
The literature comparing public and private ownership considers incomplete contracts as a source of
inefficiency in the public sector. Hart et al. (1997), Schmidt (1996) and Laffont and Tirole (1991), for
instance, show that public managers invest too little in cost reduction since the government can appropriate
the returns of their investment. In fact, because of contract incompleteness, the government/owner cannot
commit to leave to the manager any rent related to his performance. This leads to a soft budget constraint:
public managers cannot appropriate their profits and are not liable for their losses. In the case of the US
hospital industry, Duggan (2000) finds empirical evidence that public managers do not respond to financial
incentives as much as their public conterpart since they face a soft budget constraint. The incomplete
contracts litterature, however, always leads to dichotomous solution, where either public or private provision
is optimal. It does not allow for the presence of mixed delivery systems.
Even if a public and a private hospital coexist in our the model, we do not use the same approach of
the mixed oligopolies literature, which assumes different objectives for the public and the private manager
and the presence of competition (see Cremer et al., 1989 and De Fraja and Delbono, 1989). In this spirit,
Jofre-Bonet (2000) looks at a health care market where a public and a private hospital choose a quality level
and compete à la Cournot, and the public provider maximizes consumers’ surplus. In our model the public
hospital is a rent maximizer, and the price is regulated.
Previous works from Ma and Grassi (2008, 2010) are close to our study. They examine the impact of
public rationing on the price of private hospitals; the price in the public sector is zero while patients have to
pay out of pocket if they visit a private provider. In our model the price of the private hospital is regulated
and patients do not pay for the health care they receive. The focus here is on a third payer that may or may
not contract with private hospitals.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the main features of the model. In section 3,
we characterize the optimal mix of public and private provision. In section 4 we study the optimality of a
no-dumping constraint for the private hospital. We devote section 5 to concluding remarks. All proofs of
lemmas and propositions, when not specified otherwise, are collected in the appendix.
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2 The model
The regulator acts as an insurer for the population and must guarantee the treatment to all patients.
The size of the sick population is normalized to one and each patient needs one unit of a uniform treatment.
Patients face a price equal to zero irrespectively on whether they get the treatment from a public or a private
hospital. We focus here exclusively on public patients seeking services in public and private hospitals, while
the government acts as a third payer. Patients all get the same benefit v from being treated, but they differ
in the severity of their illness, which affects the cost of the treatment they receive. Even if the diagnostic
group (the illness) is the same, the cost of treatment is not homogeneous across patients. Elderly patients,
for instance, may require a higher level of care, implying higher costs. The severity of illness is denoted by
c, with c ∼ U(0, 1).4 Patients do not observe the realization of c .
Two hospitals are available on the market; one is publicly owned, the other is privately owned. The public
and the private hospitals have the same technology. Treating patient i entails for hospital j a cost:
Cij = kj + ci,
where ci is the severity of illness and kj ∈ {k, k¯} is an hospital specific parameter. Each hospital observes
both kj and ci prior to the treatment; both are private information of the hospital. There are no fixed costs
for the treatment.
Managers can influence the hospital specific cost parameter through an efficiency enhancing investment
that can be made before production takes place. The investment costs S to the manager, and leads to a
low hospital specific cost (k) with probability e ∈ (0, 1). If no investment is made, the hospital has a high
hospital specific (k¯) cost with probability one. We assume that S is a private cost of the manager, so that
the investment can be interpreted as managerial effort.
The private manager maximizes profits, since he can appropriate them. In particular, he can influence
the average cost of treatment in two ways: by dumping costly patients, which reduces the average c, and by
exerting effort in cost reduction, which reduces k in expectation.
The public manager cannot appropriate profits. Whenever profit (or losses) occur in the public hospital,
they add to the public sector balance sheet. Unless his compensation depends on the realization of costs,
4 Assuming a uniform distribution simplifies the exposition and the intuition of the results. In the conclusion we discuss the
sensitivity of the results to a change in the distribution of c, and argue that the main qualitative results are robust to such a
change.
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the public manager has no incentive to reject patients or to exert effort. Similarly, Laffont and Tirole (1991)
assume that the government appropriates the returns of the investments made by the public manager. Thus,
the incentives of the public manager to invest are weak, if contract incompleteness makes it impossible to
compensate him for the incurred cost. 5
Health treatments can be publicly provided or bought from the private hospital. The only instrument for
the regulator is a prospective reimbursement. The underlying assumption for such a remuneration scheme is
that, ex ante, the regulator cannot write complete contracts, conditional on costs. Even ex post, costs are not
contractible. Hence, there is no room for renegotiation. The problem of the regulator reduces to choosing the
optimal price per treatment p. Contract incompleteness also implies that it is impossible for the regulator to
condition the remuneration of managers on the realization of costs. Consequently, the remuneration of the
public manager is a fixed transfer (see Schmidt, 1996). The regulator also has the ability to set the extra
waiting time at the public hospital, denoted by w ≥ 0. Without loss of generality, the waiting time at the
private hospital is normalized to zero, so w can be interpreted as the total waiting time at the public hospital.
The regulator chooses the price p that maximizes the welfare of the patients net of health expenditures,
under the constraint that all patients get the treatment. The profit of the private hospital has zero weight
in the welfare function, while the profit of the public hospital is internalized by the regulator.
The timing is as follows:
1- The regulator sets a waiting time w for the public hospital,
2- The regulator sets a price p.
3- The private and public managers choose whether to exert effort at a private cost S.
4- The realization of k occurs. The value of k is private information of the managers.
5- The patients seek care at the hospital they prefer. If dumped by the private hospital, they will visit
the public one and get the treatment.
6- The hospitals receive p for each treated patient. The profits of the public hospital are appropriated by
the regulator.
As a benchmark, consider the case of a single private hospital that treats all patients (no dumping is
possible), receiving a price p per patient. In this scenario the manager has the highest incentives to exert
effort, since he cannot reject patients. The manager exerts effort if and only if it permits to reduce total
5 This situation can apply to countries where the remuneration of public providers has shifted towards a DRG reimbursement.
However, the public managers face a soft budget constraint, since they are not liable for incurred losses.
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costs, that is to say if and only if :
k¯ − e∆k + 1
2
− S ≤ k¯ + 1
2
.
The left hand side represents total costs when effort is exerted, while the right hand side represents total cost
when no effort is exerted. Effort takes place if and only if e¯∆k ≥ S : the expected gains in efficiency exceed
the private cost to the manager. To rule out cases in which managerial effort never takes place, we will thus
make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 e∆k ≥ S.
Another assumption that will hold throughout the paper is:
Assumption 2 ∆k ≤ 1.
This assumption ensures that the supports of the random unitary costs k¯+c and k+c intersect. This implies
that, k+ 1 ≥ k¯. The economic consequences of this assumption will be discussed in the following paragraph.
In the following, we will solve the problem by backward induction analyzing the behavior of patients and
managers first. In the next section we will then solve the problem of the regulator.
2.1 Patients’ behavior
As said above, patients face a price equal to zero in each hospital. Consequently, the hospital choice only
depends on the waiting time at the public hospital, w (as we said earlier, the waiting time is normalized to
zero). We assume that there are no search or switching costs, so that patients can costlessly pass from one
hospital to another. Let us denote by DPU (w) and DPR(w) the number of patients seeking care at the public
and at the private hospital, with DPU (w) +DPR(w) = 1.
If the waiting time w is equal to zero, they are indifferent between the two hospitals. Thus, each hospital
has the same demand: DPU (0) = DPR(0) = 1/2; the distribution of the patient specific cost is uniform
(c ∼ U(0, 1)), and the average patient specific cost is 1/2. If the waiting time w is positive, all patients first
visit the private hospital. Thus DPR(w > 0) = 1 and DPU (w > 0) = 0. In both cases, the private hospital
might dump some patients, who would then seek care in the public one.
Summarizing,
DPR(w) =

1/2 if w = 0
1 if w > 0,
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and DPU (w) = 1−DPR(w)
In the following, whenever there is no ambiguity, we will use the simplified notations DPR and DPU .
2.2 Private hospital’s behavior
The objective of the private manager is to maximize profits. Once the regulated price is set, the manger
chooses whether to undertake the investment in cost reduction. Subsequently, DPR(w) patients seek care at
the private hospital. Given the realization of the hospital specific cost parameter kPR, patients are either
offered a treatment or dumped depending on their patient specific cost. In the following, we proceed by
backward induction in order to characterize the minimal regulated price that elicits the investment in cost
reduction.
Ex post, DPR(w) patients visit the private hospital. Given the regulated price p, and the realization of k,
the hospital treats a patients with cost c if and only if
p ≥ kPR + c.
For any given price p and realization of kPR, the share of patients that receive the treatment, conditional on
visiting the private hospital, is
d(p, kPR) =

0 if p ≤ k
p− kPR if kPR < p ≤ kPR + 1
1 if p > kPR + 1
(1)
for kPR ∈ {k, k¯}. The total amount of treatments provided by the private hospital is equal to DPRd(p, kpr).
We define d¯(p) ≡ d(p, k¯) and d(p) ≡ d(p, k). Assumption 2 implies that k < k¯ ≤ k+ 1 < k¯+ 1, so that there
exists no price p such that d¯(p) = 0 and d(k) = 1. The private hospital never satisfies the whole demand if
the effort in cost reduction has been successful, while it dumps all patients if kPR turns out to be high. In
other words, the gain in efficiency due to the effort (∆k) is not too high. 6
Ex ante, taking p and w as given, the manager decides whether to exert effort or not. The expected profit
6 This assumption merely facilitates the exposition and does not reduce the generality of the model, as we will discussed later.
If ∆k > 1 the private manager would be more prone to exert effort, and contracting with the private hospital more desirable.
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when no effort is exerted is
ΠPR(0, p, w) = DPR
[ˆ d¯(p)
0
(p− k¯ − c)dc
]
,
where the profit depends on the probability of a low cost realization and on the regulatory parameters.
Conversely, the expected profit when the effort is exerted is
ΠPR(e, p, w) = DPR
[
e
(ˆ d(p)
0
(p− k− c)dc
)
+ (1− e)
(ˆ d¯(p)
0
(p− k¯ + c)dc
)]
.
Let us define ∆Π(p, w) ≡ ΠPR(e p, w)−ΠPR(0 p, w) the difference between the expected profits with and
without investment in cost reduction. The private manager exerts effort if and only if ∆ΠPR(p, w) ≥ S.
The following lemma establishes an important property of the function ∆Π(p, w).
Lemma 1 The expected return of managerial effort, ∆Π(p, w) is non-decreasing in the regulated price p.
The incentives to exert effort are increasing in the regulated price. Thus, effort will be made for any price
p ≥ p˜ such that
∆Π(p˜, w) = S. (2)
The following proposition characterizes the minimal price eliciting effort as a function of the cost of effort S.
Proposition 1 The private hospital exerts effort if and only if the regulated price p is greater than p˜, where
p˜ =

√
2S
eDPR
+ k ∈ ]k, k¯] if S/DPR ≤ e¯(∆k)2/2
S
DPR(e∆k)
− ∆k2 + k¯ ∈
]
k¯, k + 1
]
if e¯(∆k)2/2 < S/DPR ≤ e∆k (1−∆k/2)
1 + k¯ −
√
2
(
∆k − SeDPR
)
∈ ]k + 1, k¯ + 1] if S/DPR > e¯∆k (1−∆k/2)
(3)
The minimal price eliciting effort is increasing in S and is decreasing in e and in ∆k. This is rather
intuitive: the higher the efficiency gain from effort (or the lower the cost of effort), the lower the necessary
monetary incentives. When the private manager exerts effort, the expected number of treatments increases
with the efficiency of the effort. Conversely, the number of patients treated if no effort is exerted is constant.
For any price, an increase in the returns to effort leads to an increase in the difference between expected
profits with and without effort; this makes it easier for the regulator to elicit effort.
For similar reasons, the minimal price eliciting effort is decreasing in w. The higher the number of patients
seeking care at the private facility, the higher the incentive to reduce variable costs.
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2.3 Public hospital’s behavior
The public manager cannot appropriate profits, and his compensation consists of a fixed wage. Irrespective
of the realization of the hospital specific cost parameter, he does not have any incentives to turn down patients.
Consequently the public hospital treats all the patients that initially chose it, and the patients that were
dumped from the private hospital. The total supply of the public hospital depends on the initial demands and
on the behavior of the private hospital, and is equal to DPU +(1−d(p, kPR))DPR = 1−DPRd(p, kPR). The
average severity of illness of the patients that visit the public hospital first is equal to 1/2 ; the severity of illness
of the patients that have been dumped from the private hospital is equal to
´ 1
d(p, kPR)
cdc/(1− d(p, kPR)) =
(1 + d(p, kPR)) /2. Note that the higher the supply of the private hospital, the higher the expected severity
of illness of the public patients.
Ex ante, the manager chooses whether to exert effort in cost reduction. Since the cost realization cannot
be specified in his contract, it cannot affect the compensation of the manager. Even if a loss occurs ex post,
it is internalized by the regulator. Faced with such a soft budget constraint, the public manager never exerts
any effort. The cost realization at the public hospital is always k¯.
Ex post, the profit of the public hospital is equal to
ΠPU (p, w, kPR) = (1−DPR)
(
p− k¯ − 1
2
)
+DPR (1− d(p, kPR))
[
p− k¯ − 1 + d(p, kPR)
2
]
. (4)
Note that this profit might be either negative or positive. We can derive the profit of the public hospital
when the private hospital has high costs k¯:
ΠPU (p, w, k¯) =
(
p− k¯ − 1
2
)
−DPRd¯(p)
(
p− k¯ − d¯(p)
2
)
.
The profit of the public hospital when the private hospital has low costs k is:
ΠPU (p, w, k) =
(
p− k¯ − 1
2
)
−DPRd(p)
(
p− k¯ − d
2
)
.
The first term of each expression represents the profit of the public hospital when it treats all patients. The
second term represents the loss in profits due to the fact that DPRd(p, kPR) patients are treated in the
private hospital.
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3 Optimal regulation
The regulator acts as an insurer that seeks to provide one unit of treatment to the entire population at
minimal cost. Thus the objective function of the regulator is
W (p, w) =

v − wDPU − p+ ΠPU (p, w, k) if p < p˜
v − wDPU − p+ eΠPU (p, w, k) + (1− e)ΠPU (p, w, k¯) if p ≥ p˜
which is the difference between patients’ welfare and expected public health expenditures. We continue to
proceed by backward induction. First, we characterize the optimal price for any level of the waiting time.
Then, we characterize the optimal waiting time for the public hospital.
We consider first two benchmark scenarios. In the first one (called PR), only a private hospital is available.
In the second one (called PU), only a public hospital is available. We then turn to the scenario (called MIX)
in which the regulator can contract with both a public and a private hospital.
3.1 Government contracting with a single hospital
Consider first the scenario PR, in which the regulator has to provide the service to all patients and is
constrained to contract with a private hospital. Ex post, the private hospital treats all patients if and only
if p ≥ kPR + 1. Since the only instrument is the price, the regulator has to choose a price ex ante that is
sufficient to cover costs in any state of the world. Thus, the optimal price, coinciding with the total health
expenditures is equal to pPR = k¯ + 1. As long as e∆k ≥ S, the manager has an incentive to exert effort.
However, the returns to effort are completely appropriated by the hospital.
Consider now the scenario PU in which the regulator is constrained to contract with a public hospital.
The problem of the regulator reduces to
max
p, w
v − w − p+ [p− k¯ − 1/2] = v − w − k¯ − 1/2
Clearly the optimal waiting cost is equal to zero. The welfare function is independent from the price,
since ex post the regulator always ends up paying the total production costs of the public hospital. The
total public health expenditure is equal to k¯+ 1/2. Comparing this result with the previous one leads to the
following proposition:
Proposition 2 If only one hospital is used, and the regulator is constrained to treat all patients, then con-
tracting with a public hospital dominates contracting with a private hospital.
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Proof. Straightforward
If a single hospital is used as a last resort, it is not possible to distort quantities. If the hospital is private,
the regulator has to set a price equal to the highest realization of costs in order to prevent dumping. Thus,
the regulator prefers to contract with the public hospital, which treats all patients irrespective of the price.
In such a case, total health expenditures equal the average cost. Quite naturally, the possibility to dump is
a negative attribute of a hospital when the regulator needs to treat all patients.
3.2 Government contracting with a public and a private hospital
3.2.1 Optimal price
In this section, we consider the MIX scenario, in which the regulator can contract with both a public and
a private hospital.
Patients’ welfare only depends on the waiting time. Thus, taking the waiting time as given, the problem
of the regulator reduces to minimizing the expected health expenditures:
min
p
HE(p, w) =

p−ΠPU (p, w, k) if p < p˜
p− eΠPU (p, w, k)− (1− e)ΠPU (p, w, k¯) if p ≥ p˜
.
p is the total reimbursement to be given to the private and public hospitals. The second term relates to the
production costs of the public hospital. Using the definition of the profit of the public hospital, we have
HE(p, w) =

k¯ + 12 +DPRd¯(p)
(
p− k¯ − d¯(p)2
)
if p < p˜
k¯ + 12 +DPR
[
ed(p)
(
p− k¯ − d(p)2
)
+ (1− e)d¯(p)
(
p− k¯ − d¯(p)2
)]
if p ≥ p˜
. (5)
This expression has an easy interpretation. k¯ + 1/2 represent the expected health expenditures if the public
hospital exclusively provides the service. The residual term in each line represents the difference between
the expected payment to the private hospital for treating DPR
(
ed(p) + (1− e)d¯(p)) patients and the total
cost of treating the same patients in the public facility. Of course, it is optimal to contract with the private
hospital if and only if this difference is negative.
We denote the optimal price by pMIX . We will first establish a property of the objective function of the
regulator.
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Lemma 2 Any price p < p˜ is dominated by p = 0, where p˜ is the minimal price eliciting high effort defined
by equation (3).
This result is quite intuitive. There is no reason to contract with the private hospital unless it is more
efficient than the public one in expectation.
Remark that if the price is equal to zero, HE(0, w) = k¯ + 1/2. This are the total health expenditures
when only the public hospital provides the services. A direct consequence of Lemma 2 is that the optimal
price is positive if and only if
k¯ + 1/2 > min
p≥p˜
HE(p, w) = min
p≥p˜
k¯ +
1
2
+DPR
[
ed
(
p− k¯ − d(p)
2
)
+ (1− e)d¯
(
p− k¯ − d¯(p)
2
)]
.
In order to characterize the optimal price, we will first find the solution of minp≥p˜ HE(p, w); then, we
will compare the result with k¯ + 1/2.
If S/DPR ≤ e¯(∆k)2/2 we know from Proposition 1 that p˜ ∈
]
k, k¯
]
. Expected health expenditures are
piecewise-defined and continuous for any p ≥ p˜ and they have the form

k¯ + 12 + eDPR(p− k)
(
p−k
2 −∆k
)
if p ∈ ]p˜, k¯]
k¯ + 12 +DPR
[(
(p−k¯)2
2
)
− e (∆k)22
]
if p ∈ ]k¯, k + 1]
k¯ + 12 +DPR
[
e
(
p− k¯ − 1/2)+ (1− e)( (p−k¯)22 )] if p ∈ ]k + 1, k¯ + 1]
p if p > k¯ + 1
It is easy to show that the function is decreasing for any p ≤ k¯, and increasing for any p > k¯. Consequently, if
S/DPR ≤ e(∆k)2/2, the price that minimizes expenditures conditional on eliciting effort is equal to k¯. Such
a price implies that a positive amount of patients is treated in the private hospital if the hospital-specific
cost realization is k. Otherwise, all patients are treated by the public hospital and the private hospital makes
zero profits. Expected expenditures are equal to k¯ + 1/2 − eDPR(∆k)2/2, which is smaller than k¯ + 1/2,
the expression of the expected expenditures when p = 0. Thus, we can conclude that pMIX = k¯ whenever
S/DPR ≤ e(∆k)2/2.
If e(∆k)2/2 < S/DPR ≤ e∆k (1−∆k/2), we know from Proposition 1 that p˜ ∈
]
k¯, k + 1
]
. Expected
13
health expenditures are piecewise-defined and continuous for any p ≥ p˜ and they have the form

k¯ + 12 +DPR
[(
(p−k¯)2
2
)
− e (∆k)22
]
if p ∈ ]p˜, k + 1]
k¯ + 12 +DPR
[
e
(
p− k¯ − 1/2)+ (1− e)( (p−k¯)22 )] if p ∈ ]k + 1, k¯ + 1]
p if p > k¯ + 1
It is easy to show that this function is increasing for any p ≥ p˜. Consequently, if e(∆k)2/2 < S/DPR ≤
e
(
∆k − (∆k)2/2), the price that minimize expenditures conditional on eliciting effort is equal to p˜ =
S/DPR(e∆k) − ∆k/2 + k¯. The private hospital treats a positive amount of patients for any cost real-
ization. Expected health expenditures are equal to k¯+ 12 +DPR
[
(S/DPR −∆k/2)2 − e(∆k)2
]
/2. They are
smaller than HE(0, w) if and only if
(
S
DPR (e∆k)
− ∆k
2
)2
− e(∆k)2 ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ S/DPR ≤ e(∆k)2
(√
e+
1
2
)
.
In conclusion, if e(∆k)2/2 < S/DPR ≤ min
{
e∆k (1−∆k/2) , e(∆k)2 (√e+ 12)}, then the optimal price is
the minimal price eliciting managerial effort, i.e. pMIX = p˜.
If S/DPR > e∆k (1−∆k/2), we know from Proposition 1 that p˜ ∈
]
k + 1, k¯ + 1
]
. Expected health
expenditures are piecewise-defined and continuous for any p ≥ p˜ and they have the form

k¯ + 12 +DPR
[
e
(
p− k¯ − 1/2)+ (1− e)( (p−k¯)22 )] if p ∈ ]p˜, k¯ + 1]
p if p > k¯ + 1
It is easy to show that this function is increasing for any p ≥ p˜. Consequently, if S/DPR > e∆k (1−∆k/2),
the price that minimize expenditures conditional on eliciting effort is equal to p˜ = 1+k¯−√2 (∆k − S/eDPR).
The private hospital treats all the patients if the cost realization is low, and a positive share of patients if
the cost realization is high. Expected health expenditures are equal to
k¯ +
1
2
+DPR
e(1/2−√2(∆k − S
eDPR
))
+ (1− e)1
2
(
1−
√
2
(
∆k − S
eDPR
))2 .
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They are smaller than HE(0, w) if and only if
e
(
1
2
−
√
2
(
∆k − S
eDPR
))
+ (1− e)1
2
(
1−
√
2
(
∆k − S
eDPR
))2
≤ 0
⇐⇒ S/DPR ≤ e
(
∆k − (1 +√e)−2/2) .
In conclusion, if e∆k (1−∆k/2) < S/DPR ≤ e
(
∆k − (1 +√e)−2/2), then the optimal price is the minimal
price eliciting managerial effort, i.e. pMIX = p˜.
The following proposition formally characterizes the optimal price.
Proposition 3 If the regulator is constrained to treat all patients and can use both a public and a private
hospital, the cost minimizing regulated price price depends on the efficiency of the managerial effort. Define
S¯ ≡ min{e(∆k)2 (√e+ 1/2) , e (∆k − (1 +√e)−2/2)}.Three cases might arise:
(i) If S/DPR ≤ e(∆k)2/2, then pMIX = k¯.
(ii) If e(∆k)2/2 < S/DPR ≤ S¯, then pMIX = p˜, where p˜ is the minimal price eliciting high effort defined
by equation (3).
(iii) If S/DPR > S¯, then pMIX = 0, and no treatment is bought from the private hospital.
Point (i) of Proposition 3 has been proved above. The proof of points (ii) and (iii) is provided in the
appendix.
The intuition for this result is very simple. It is not possible to get effort and truthful revelation from the
last resort hospital since quantities cannot be distorted. Consequently, it is always optimal to use the public
hospital as a last resort since it does not dump patients and the price is equal to the average cost. However, if
the effort in cost reduction is efficient, the price permitting to elicit effort in the private hospital is relatively
low, and contracting with the private hospital is expenditure minimizing due to gains in efficiency.
If the cost of effort is very low with respect to its benefit, then the price offered to the private hospital
is positive and elicits high effort. The private hospital treats some patients only if the hospital-specific cost
realization is k. Otherwise, all patients are treated by the public hospital. If costs turn out to be high for
the private hospital, it is optimal to get the patients treated at average cost by the public one. The private
hospital profit is equal to zero if costs turn out to be high.
For intermediate efficiency of the managerial effort, the regulator still finds it optimal to contract with
the private hospital, but the minimal price that elicits effort is higher than in the previous scenario. In this
case, the private hospital earns a positive profit even if its cost turn out to be high. This is suboptimal ex
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post, since it would be less costly for the regulator to get all the treatment in the private hospital. However,
ex ante, the expected gains in efficiency justify the extra rent guaranteed to the private manager.
Finally, if the effort in cost reduction is very costly with respect to its benefit, no treatment is bought
from the private hospital. In this case, eliciting effort is too costly for the regulator because it implies a high
agency rent to the private manager.
Summarizing, our results suggests that the regulator should contract with private hospitals for services
involving high margins of cost reduction. This might be the case of elective surgery, where the hospital
managers can engage in relatively cheap and reliable efficiency-enhancing investments, such as rational use
of operating rooms. For treatments involving high investment for low efficiency gain, the production should
be concentrated in public facilities. For instance, emergency services are good candidates for exclusive public
provision, as their demand is stochastic and it is impossible to schedule treatments in advance.
3.2.2 Optimal waiting time
In the first stage of the game, the regulator sets the waiting time at the public hospital. If the waiting
time was equal to zero, patients would be indifferent between the public and private hospital. Thus, 1/2 of
the patients would visit the public hospital, while 1/2 would visit the private hospital first, and the public
one only if they happened to be dumped. Conversely, if the waiting time is greater than zero, all patients
will visit the private hospital first. We can prove the following result:
Proposition 4 If the regulator is constrained to treat all patients and can use both a public and a private
hospital, the optimal waiting time depends on the efficiency of the managerial effort. Two cases might arise:
(i) If S ≤ S¯ then wMIX = , with  > 0,  < ¯ and ¯ very small.
(ii) If S > S¯, then wMIX = 0.
Note that it is optimal to contract with the private hospital (by setting a price greater than zero) if and
only if ed
(
p− k¯ − d/2)+ (1− e)d¯ (p− k¯ − d¯/2) < 0, irrespective of the waiting time. This inequality can be
rewritten as
(
ed(p) + (1− e)d¯(p)) p < (ed(p) + (1− e)d¯(p)) k¯+e (d(p))2 /2+(1−e) (d¯(p))2 /2, meaning that
the expected reimbursement to the private hospital is smaller than the cost of treating the same patients in
the public hospital. In such a case, it is clear that the regulator wants all patients to visit the private hospital
first. If this were not the case, the public hospital would treat some low cost patients at a higher cost than its
private counterpart. A positive waiting time ensures that patients are allocated optimally across hospitals.
In addition, a very low waiting time is sufficient for DPR to be equal to one. Thus, the optimal sorting
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of patients across hospitals can be achieved at a very low cost in terms of patients’ welfare.
3.2.3 Market shares, profits and expected health expenditures
If the cost of effort is small with respect to the efficiency gain of effort (S ≤ e(∆k)2/2), the regulator
always wants to elicit effort in the private sector. In this case, the reimbursement per patient is equal to k¯,
the private hospital treats ∆k ≤ 1 patients only when the realization of k is k and the expected number of
patients treated in the private sector is e¯∆k. The market share of the public hospital is positive whatever the
realization of costs in the private hospital. The presence of the public hospital permits to leave no rents to
the private one if the latter does manage to reduce costs. The expected profit of the private hospital is equal
to e(∆k)2/2 and is thus increasing in the return to effort and decreasing in S. Expected health expenditures
are
HE(pMIX) = k¯ +
1
2
− e (∆k)
2
2
, (6)
which are decreasing with e and ∆k and is independent of S.
If S is bigger with respect to the efficiency gain, the social planner has to leave some rent to the private
manager even if the realization of the costs is k¯. In such a case, the optimal price is equal to the minimal price
that permits to elicit high effort. In this range of parameters, two cases have to be considered, depending on
the level of S.
If S ≤ S¯ ≤ e (∆k − (∆k)2/2), the optimal price p˜ = S/e∆k−∆k/2+ k¯ belongs to the interval ]k¯, k + 1].
The private hospital treats S/e∆k + ∆k/2 < 1 patients if the realization of the cost parameter is k and
S/e∆k − ∆k/2 < 1 patients if the realization of the cost parameter is k¯. Note that both quantities are
increasing in S and decreasing in ∆k and e in the relevant range of parameters. The expected profit of the
private hospital is equal to e(p˜− k)2/2 + (1− e)(p˜− k¯)2/2− S which is increasing in S and decreasing in e
and ∆k . In fact, the higher the cost of effort or the lower the efficiency gain, the higher the regulated price.
Expected health expenditures are
HE(pMIX) = k¯ +
1
2
− e(∆k)
2
2
+
1
2
(
S
e∆k
− ∆k
2
)2
, (7)
which are decreasing in e and in ∆k, while it is increasing in S. Of course, if higher profits have to be given
to the private hospital, the cost of provision is bigger.
If S¯ > S > e
(
∆k − (∆k)2/2), the optimal price p˜ = 1 + k¯ −√2 (e∆k − S) /e¯ belongs to the interval
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]
k + 1, k¯ + 1
]
. The private hospital treats all patients if the hospital-specific cost parameter is low, and a
share 1−√2 (e∆k − S) /e in case of high cost k¯. This quantity is decreasing in ∆k and e, and increasing in
S. In fact, the minimal price eliciting effort decreases in the efficiency gain of the effort in cost reduction and
increases in S. The expected profit of the hospital is equal to p˜
[
e+ (1− e) (p˜− k¯)] , which is increasing in S
and decreasing in ∆k . Expected health expenditures are
HE(pMIX) = 1 + k¯ −
√
2
(
e∆k − S
e
)
+ (1− e)
(
e∆k − S
e
)
. (8)
Again, the cost is decreasing in ∆k, and e while it is increasing in S. The interpretation is similar to the one
of the previous case.
Finally, when S is very high with respect to the efficiency gain of effort, it becomes too expensive for the
regulator to contract with the private hospital. In this Eliciting effort from the private manager is too costly
with respect to the potential gains.
An illustration of the optimal price, private expected production and profits, and expected health expen-
ditures as a function of S presented in Figure 1. This figure shows that the model predicts a non monotonic
relationship between some of these quantities and the cost of managerial effort (its gains being fixed).
Expected health expenditures decrease in the efficiency of managerial effort. Conversely, both the regu-
lated price and the expected amount of services provided by the private hospital exhibit a non monotonic
relationship with the efficiency of managerial effort. If this efficiency is low, the price equals zero and the
private hospital is excluded from production. As the efficiency of effort exceeds a critical value, it becomes
optimal for the regulator to elicit effort, but this is only possible for a high regulated price. However, the
latter decreases in the efficiency of effort until a certain threshold, after which it is constant and equal to k¯.
The expected amount of services provided follows a similar path. The profit of the private hospital is also
non monotonic in the efficiency of effort. If efficiency is small, the profit is equal to zero. As the efficiency
of effort exceeds a critical value, profits are very high since both the price and the expected quantities are
high. They subsequently decrease. When the effort is very efficient in reducing costs, the price is constant
and low. However, profits might rise again due to higher expected quantities. 7
7 Note that Assumption 2 plays a role in the results. If ∆k was bigger than one, this would enhance the role of the private
hospital. In this case, setting a price in the interval
]
k + 1, k¯
]
, the regulator could elicit effort without the private hospital’s
producing in the bad state of the world.
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Figure 1: Optimal price, expected private supply, private profit and health expenditures as a function of S (e = 0.5, ∆k = 0.6).
4 No-dumping constraint on the private hospital
Our previous results depend on the hypothesis that the private hospital can freely dump the patients
whose cost exceeds the regulated price. We now turn to the case when the private hospital is forbidden
to dump. We will assume a waiting time w > 0 in the public hospital.8 The timing is the same as in
the previous sections. However, in period one, the regulator can also decide whether to enforce or not a
no-dumping constraint on the private hospital. Under this constraint, the private manager has to report the
hospital-specific cost realization. Depending on the reported costs, the regulator obliges the private hospital
to treat the maximal possible amount of patients, under the constraint of non negative profits.
We show that it is not always in the interest of the regulator to enforce the constraint. The no-dumping
constraint reduces the rent left to the private hospital. Consequently, eliciting effort and truthful revelation
of the cost type may be impossible under a no-dumping constraint. In the following section we show that, if
the efficiency of the effort is not too high, the low cost hospital has an incentive to mimic high cost type in
order to get a positive profit.
8 We can show that a positive waiting time is indeed optimal, but we will omit the proof here, since it is very similar to the
proof of Proposition 4.
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4.1 Private hospital’s behavior when dumping is banned
In this section, we assume that the regulator can use both hospitals and can oblige the private hospital
not to dump. We will call this regime MND. In many health care systems, this might be a relevant setting.
The price (the DRG reimbursement) is often set ex ante by law. Ex post, the government may contract on
quantities with private hospitals, and enforce a no-dumping regulation.9
All patients visit the private hospital first. The hospital-specific cost parameter kPR is still private
information of the hospital. Once the realization of kPR occurs, the private hospital reports k′, and has to
treat the maximum amount of patients under the constraint of non-negative profits.
For any price p offered to the private hospital and for any reported k′, the private hospital has to treat dˆ
patients, where dˆ satisfies:
dˆ(p, k′) = arg max
d
d
s.t.
ˆ d
0
(p− k′ − c)dc ≥ 0.
Thus,
dˆ(p, k′) =

0 if p ≤ k′
2(p− k′) if k′ < p ≤ k′ + 12
1 if p > k′ + 12
Ex post, the profit of the private manager is thus equal to:
ˆ dˆ(p,k′)
0
(p− kPR − c) dc,
where k′ and kPR are the reported cost parameter and the real cost parameter. The manager of a low
cost private hospital might have an incentive to mimic the high cost type. On the one hand, truthfully
reporting k permits to treat more patients, and get a higher revenue dˆ(p, k′)p. On the other hand, mimicking
the high cost type permits to get rid of patients with a high severity of illness and reduces total costs
dˆ(p, k′)
(
k + dˆ(p, k′)/2
)
. The behavior of the manager depends on which of these effects dominates. The
following proposition characterizes the behavior of the manager depending on the regulated price.
9 In Italy, for instance, the DRG reimbursement is set by low at the national level. Regions contract with private hospitals
on the maximum amount of services to be provided, given this reimbursement. See Francese and Romanelli (2010).
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Proposition 5 Consider the case when the private hospital is forbidden to dump.
If ∆k ≤ 1/2, the private manager exerts effort in cost reduction and truthfully reports the cost realization
if and only if p ≥ k¯ + 1/2.
If ∆k > 1/2, any price induces the truthful revelation of the hospital specific cost parameter. For any price
p ≥ pˆ = k+1/2+S/e, the manager exerts effort. The price pˆ always belongs to the interval ]k + 1/2, k¯ + 1/2].
The intuition for this result is very simple. If a private hospital cannot dump patients freely, it might
report a high hospital-specific cost parameter in order to be allowed to reject patients with a high severity
of illness. If the efficiency differential is low (∆k ≤ 1/2), dˆ(p, k) − dˆ(p, k¯) is quite low. Thus, if a manager
mimics the high cost hospital, the loss in revenues is not too high. At the same time, the hospital can get rid
of some high cost patients and reduce its total costs. For any p < k¯+ 1/2, it can be shown that the reduction
in costs exceeds the loss in revenues. Thus, mimicking is a dominant strategy. If p ≥ k¯ + 1/2, there is no
gain from mimicking, since dˆ(p, k) = dˆ(p, k¯).
If the efficiency differential is high (∆k > 1/2), mimicking the high cost type is never profitable for the
private manager, since it entails a loss in revenues larger than the reduction in total costs. The minimal price
eliciting effort is always greater than k+ 1/2. If the hospital-specific cost parameter turns out to be low, the
private hospital treats all patients.
4.2 Government contracting with a public and a private hospital when dumping
is banned
Consider first the case when ∆k ≤ 1/2. If p < k¯+1/2, it has been shown in Proposition 4 that the private
hospital always reports high costs. Expected health expenditures are equal to:
HE(p) = k¯ +
1
2
+ dˆ(p, k¯)
(
p− k¯ − dˆ(p, k¯)
2
)
.
Since p < k¯+ 1/2 , either dˆ(p, k¯) = 0 or dˆ(p, k¯) = 2(p− k¯). In both cases, expected health expenditures are
the same as HE(0) = k¯+ 1/2 and the regulator is indifferent between any price in the interval
[
0, k¯ + 1/2
[
.
If p ≥ k¯ + 1/2, then dˆ(p, k¯) = dˆ(p, k) = 1. In this case HE(p) = p ≥ k¯ + 1/2. Such a price is clearly
suboptimal for the regulator.
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When ∆k > 1/2, expected health expenditures are equal to:
HE(p) =

k¯ + 12 + dˆ(p, k¯)
(
p− k¯ − dˆ(p, k¯)2
)
if p < pˆ
k¯ + 12 + e
[
dˆ(p, k)
(
p− k¯ − dˆ(p, k)2
)]
+ (1− e)
[
dˆ(p, k¯)
(
p− k¯ − dˆ(p, k¯)2
)]
if p ≥ pˆ
If p < pˆ, then no effort is exerted by the private manager, kPR = 0 and health expenditures are equal to
k¯ + 1/2. The regulator is indifferent between any price in the interval [0, pˆ[.
If p ≥ pˆ, then the private hospital exerts effort and treats all the patients when the hospital specific cost
parameter is equal to k. Consequently, HE(p) = e¯p+(1− e¯) (k¯ + 1/2) .This function is increasing in p. Thus,
in this range of prices, costs are minimized if p = pˆ. To check that HE(pˆ) is a global minimum it is sufficient
to compare it with the cost of provision when p = 0. This is always the case, since pˆ ≤ k¯ + 1/2. Thus, the
cost minimizing price is pMND = pˆ=k + 1/2 + S/e.
In such a case, it is possible for the regulator to reduce costs by using a hospital that is constrained not
to dump. Expected health expenditures are equal to
HE(pMND) = k¯ +
1
2
+ S − e¯∆k
Note that this expression is smaller than k¯ + 1/2 under Assumption 1. We have proved the following result:
Proposition 6 Assume that the regulator is able to impose a no-dumping constraint on the private hospital.
If ∆k ≤ 1/2, the regulator cannot reduce expected health expenditures by contracting with the private
hospital.
If ∆k > 1/2, the regulator can reduce expected health expenditures by offering to the private hospital a
price pMND = k + 1/2 + S/e.
The no-dumping constraint reduces the rent attainable with truthful revelation, pushing managers to
mimic the high type. Only a price high enough can elicit truthful revelation. Furthermore, contracting
with the private hospital is optimal if and only if the price elicits both effort and truthful revelation. When
∆k ≤ 1/2, in order to elicit effort and truthful revelation, the regulator should set such a high price that she
prefers to use exclusively the public hospital. Conversely, when ∆k > 1/2, the price that elicits effort and
truthful is not too high. Thus, contracting with the private hospital reduces expected expenditures.
Comparing the cost of provision when dumping is allowed and when a no-dumping constraint is enforced,
it is possible to establish the following proposition.
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Proposition 7 Assume that the regulator can costlessly impose a no-dumping constraint on the private
hospital.
If ∆k ≤ 1/2, and S ≤ S¯ then it is optimal for the regulator not to enforce the constraint.
If ∆k > 1/2, it is optimal for the regulator to enforce the constraint.
In all other cases, the regulator does not contract with the private hospital.
The regulator faces a trade-off between efficiency and access to care. If the hospital is free to dump, it
can choose the profit maximizing number of patients. Thus, allowing dumping ensures a greater profit for
the private hospital. This permits to obtain effort for lower prices than in the no-dumping scenario.
Consequently, imposing a no-dumping constraint is not always optimal. For low values of ∆k, it is indeed
optimal to let the private hospital dump patients. The no-dumping constraint implies too little profits when
the cost parameter is low and truthfully reported, and the private manager lies in order to reject patients with
a high severity of illness. In such a case, the regulator is not able to appropriate the benefit of managerial
effort. Allowing the private hospital to dump reduces expected health expenditures, while the public hospital
insures that all patients are treated.
When ∆k is larger, however, it is possible to elicit effort and truthful revelation by fixing a price greater
than k + 1/2. Eliciting the investment in cost reduction is not too costly for the regulator since the benefit
of effort is high and internalized by the hospital through a positive profit in case of low cost realizations.
The model predicts that the production should be concentrated in the private hospital if kpr = k. If the cost
parameter is high, the private hospital may still serve a positive share of patients.
5 Conclusion
This paper characterizes conditions under which a regulator optimally contracts with both a public and a
private hospital for the production of health services. The private manager can appropriate profits, while the
public one cannot. We show that it is optimal to contract with the private hospital whenever a very efficient
managerial effort in cost reduction is available. If not, only the public hospital should produce, despite its
lower cost efficiency.
Another finding of the paper is that imposing a no-dumping constraint on the private hospital is not
always beneficial for the regulator, since it makes it more difficult to elicit effort and truthful revelation of
the hospital-specific cost parameter. This result is somehow counterintuitive, but is economically justified by
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the presence of asymmetric information on costs leading to a the trade-off between efficiency and access to
care.
An interesting extension of the paper would be to consider the role of physicians in hospitals’ dumping
decision. This analysis is not included in the paper and is left for further investigation. Wright (2007)
argues that the regulator might use a salary instead than a fee for service to remunerate physicians in public
hospitals in order to attract in the public sector more fairness prone physicians not engaging in dumping.
Another line of research concerns how different distributions of the patient specific cost parameter c affect
the optimal public-private mix. In fact, health costs are not likely to be distributed uniformly. Usually
most patients have similar severities of illness, while some outliers are very costly to treat. A change in the
variance of the severities of illness affects the contract offered to the private hospital and the optimality of
a no-dumping constraint. It is easy to show that, if high severities of illness are relatively more rare (the
distribution is first order stochastically dominated by the uniform distribution), the regulator finds it more
profitable to contract with the private hospital: even if the price is low, only few patients get dumped, and
it is easier to provide incentives to the private manager.
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Appendix. Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1
Since the supply of the private hospital is discontinuous in p, to prove the lemma we will analyze in turn
all the possible cases that might arise.
• If p < k, no patient are treated by the private hospital and profit is equal to zero both in case of effort
and in case of non effort. ∆Π(p, w) is equal to zero and constant in p.
• If p ∈ ]k, k¯], some patients are treated if the hospital specific cost parameter is low. Otherwise, all
patients are dumped. Then
∆Π(p, w) = DPR
(
e
(p− k)2
2
)
,
which is increasing in p. Moreover, ∆Π(k¯, w) = DPR
(
e(∆k)2/2
)
.
• If p ∈ ]k¯, k + 1], the private hospital treats a positive share of DPR(w) whichever the realization of k.
Then
∆Π(p, w) = DPR
[
e
(
(p− k)2
2
− (p− k¯)
2
2
)]
,
which is increasing in p . Moreover, limp→k¯ ∆Π(p, w) = DPR
(
e(∆k)2/2
)
, and ∆Π(k + 1, w) =
DPR
[
e
(
∆k − (∆k)2/2)].
• If p ∈ ]k + 1, k¯ + 1], the private hospital treats all patients if the hospital specific cost parameter is
low, and a positive share of patients if it is high. Then,
∆Π(p, w) = DPR
[
e
(
p− k− 1
2
− (p− k¯)
2
2
)]
,
which is increasing in p . Moreover, limp→k+1 ∆Π(p, w) = DPR
[
e
(
∆k − (∆k)2/2)] and ∆Π(k¯ +
1, w) = DPR (e∆k).
• Finally, if p > k¯ + 1, the private hospital treats all the patients whichever the realization of k. Then
∆Π(p, w) = DPR (e∆k) ,
which is constant in p. Moreover limp→k¯+1 ∆Π(k¯ + 1, w) = DPR (e∆k).
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We have shown that the function ∆Π(p, w) is piecewise-defined and continuous in p. Furthermore, it is
non-decreasing in any interval in which it is piecewise-defined. Thus, the function is monotonically non
decreasing. Similarly, we can prove that the function is increasing in w.
Proof of Proposition 1
• Consider first the case in which S/DPR <
(
e(∆k)2/2
)
. From the preceding proof we know that
∆Π(p, w) > S for any p > k. Using the monotonicity of ∆Π(p, w), and ∆Π(p, w) = 0 ∀p < k, we can
conclude that p˜ ∈ ]k, k¯]. The value of p˜ is given by
DPR
(
e
(p˜− k)2
2
)
= S ⇐⇒ p˜ =
√
2S
eDPR
+ k.
• Consider now the case in which e(∆k)2 ≤ S/DPR < e∆k (1−∆k/2). From the preceding proof, we
know that ∆Π(p, w) < S for any p < k¯ and that ∆Π(p, w) > S for any p > k + 1. Using the
monotonicity of ∆Π(p, w), we can conclude that p˜ ∈ ]k¯, k + 1]. The value of p˜ is given by
DPR
[
e
(
(p˜− k)2
2
− (p˜− k¯)
2
2
)]
= S ⇐⇒ p˜ = S
DPR (e∆k)
− ∆k
2
+ k¯.
• Consider finally the case in which S/DPR > e¯∆k (1−∆k/2). From the preceding proof, we know that
∆Π(p, w) < S for any p < k + 1 and ∆Π(p, w) > S for any p > k¯ + 1. Using the monotonicity of
∆Π(p, w), we can conclude that p˜ ∈ ]k + 1, k¯ + 1]. The value of p˜ is given by
DPR
[
e
(
p˜− k− 1
2
− (p˜− k¯)
2
2
)]
= S ⇐⇒ p˜ = 1 + k¯ −
√
2
(
∆k − S
eDPR
)
.
Proof of Lemma 2
First of all, note that if p = 0 then only the public hospital produce. Then, HE(0) = k¯ + 1/2. Consider
now a price p
′
< p˜. The private hospital does not exert any effort at this price. Expected health expenditures
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HE(p′) are then equal to
p′DPRd¯(p′, w) +
[
1−DPRd¯(p′, w)
] [
k¯ +
(
1 +DPRd¯(p
′, w)
)
/2
]
.
It is easy to prove that HE(p′) = k¯ + 1/2 + (p− k¯)DPRd¯(p′, w) + (d¯(p′, w))2/2. Since d¯(p′, w) is equal to
zero whenever p′ − k¯ ≤ 0, and positive whenever p′ − k¯ > 0, we can conclude that HE(p′) ≥ HE(0) for any
p
′
< p˜.
Proof of Proposition 3, points (ii) and (iii)
We have shown in section 3 that
e(∆k)2/2 < S/DPR ≤ min
{
e
(
∆k −∆k2/2) , e(∆k)2(√e+ 1
2
)}
=⇒ p = p˜ (9)
and
e
(
∆k −∆k2/2) < S/DPR ≤ e (∆k − (1 +√e)−2/2) =⇒ p = p˜ (10)
Note that e(∆k)2
(√
e¯+ 1/2
) ≤ e (∆k − (∆k)2/2) ⇐⇒ ∆k ≤ 1/(√e¯+1). In this case, e (∆k − (1 +√e)−2/2) ≤
e
(
∆k −∆k2/2), and condition (10) cannot be satisfied. Thus, pMIX = p˜ if and only if e(∆k)2/2 < S ≤
e(∆k)2
(√
e¯+ 1/2
)
.
Conversely, e(∆k)2
(√
e¯+ 1/2
)
< e
(
∆k − (∆k)2/2) ⇐⇒ ∆k > 1/(√e+1). In this case, e (∆k − (1 +√e)−2/2) >
e
(
∆k −∆k2/2) and condition (10) is satisfied. Then, pMIX = p˜ if and only if e(∆k)2/2 < S ≤ e (∆k − (1 +√e)−2/2).
Summarizing pMIX = p˜ if and only if e(∆k)2/2 < S/DPR ≤ min
{
e(∆k)2
(√
e+ 12
)
, e
(
∆k − (1 +√e)−2/2)}.
Proof of Proposition 4
Assume that wMIX = 0.
If 2S ≤ S¯, the optimal price is pMIX(0) ≥ p˜(0) ≥ 0. Since p˜ is decreasing in w, this price also elicits
effort if the waiting time is positive. The difference between the total cost of provision in the two cases,
HE(pMIX(0), 0)−HE(pMIX(0), w > 0) is equal to
−1
2
[
ed(pMIX(0))
(
pMIX(0)− k¯ − d(p
MIX(0))
2
)
+ (1− e)d¯(pMIX(0))
(
pMIX(0)− k¯ − d¯(p
MIX(0))
2
)]
.
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This difference is negative if and only if
pMIX(0)
[
ed(pMIX(0)) + (1− e)d¯(pMIX(0))] >
k¯
[
ed(pMIX(0)) + (1− e)d¯(pMIX(0))]+ e(d(pMIX(0)))2
2
+ (1− e¯)
(
d(pMIX(0), k)
)2
2
,
which is a contradiction with pMIX(0) > 0 being cost minimizing. In fact, if this inequality holds, it is optimal
to delegate all the production to the public hospital (it is optimal to contract with the private hospital if and
only if, in expectation, the latter gets a smaller price than the average costs at the public hospital). Thus, the
inequality does not hold and we can writeHE(pMIX(0), 0) ≥ HE(pMIX(0), w > 0) ≥ HE(pMIX(w), w > 0).
A positive waiting time is expenditure minimizing. Since any positive waiting time w permits to reduce
expenditures, by pushing all patients to visit the private hospital first, wMIX = , with  > 0,  < ¯ and ¯
very small.
If 2S > S¯ no production is optimally delegated to the private hospital when wMIX = 0. The optimal
price is pMIX(0) = 0. If S ≤ S¯, from Proposition 3 we know that, whenever w > 0, a positive price reduces
expenditures with respect to a pure public provision. Thus a positive waiting time is welfare enhancing.
Conversely, if S > S¯ there are no benefits from a positive waiting time, and wMIX = 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
Consider an hospital whose cost realization is k. If p < k + 1/2, the profit of the hospital is equal to zero
whenever the manager truthfully reports the low cost parameter. If p ≥ k¯, mimicking the high cost type
leads to a positive production and a positive profit. Thus, it is optimal for the manager to misreport the
cost parameter. If p < k¯, mimicking the high cost type leads to a profit equal to zero. The manager has no
incentive to misreport. In this case, however, the expected profit is equal to zero, and the manager has no
incentive to exert effort in the first place. If p > k + 1/2, different cases might arise depending on the level
of ∆k. We consider separately the case when ∆k ≤ 1/2 and the case when ∆k > 1/2
• If ∆k ≤ 1/2, then k < k¯ ≤ k+ 1/2 < k¯+ 1/2. A price p ≥ k+ 1/2 induces the private hospital to treat
all patients if it k¯ and a positive amount of patients if it reports high costs.
If p ∈ ]k + 1/2, k¯ + 1/2], if the manager truthfully reports k′ = k, he gets a profit equal to p−k− 1/2;
by mimicking the high cost type, the manager gets a profit equal to2∆k(p − k¯). Truthfully reporting
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the cost parameter is thus incentive compatible if and only if
p− k− 1
2
− 2∆k(p− k¯) ≥ 0,
which is impossible whenever p ∈ ]k + 1/2, k¯ + 1/2] and ∆k ≤ 1/2. Thus, mimicking the high cost
type is the best strategy for a low cost hospital.
If, if p > k¯ + 1/2, the hospital treats all patients irrespectively on the reported cost parameter. There
is no incentive to misreport. Ex ante, the manger exerts high effort if and only if
p− ek− (1− e)k¯ − 1
2
− S ≥ p− k¯ − 1
2
⇐⇒ S ≤ e∆k,
which is always true under Assumption 1.
Thus, the private hospital always mimics the high cost type, in order to appropriate the rent associated
to the investment in cost reduction, unless it receives a price p > k¯ + 1/2.
• If ∆k > 1/2, then k < k + 1/2 < k¯ < k¯ + 1/2. There exist some price that induces the private hospital
to treat all the patients in case of low costs and not to treat any patients in case of high costs.
If the p ∈ ]k + 1/2, k¯] the private hospital does not treat any patient and the profit is equal to zero
whenever the manager reports a cost parameter is k¯. If the realization of the cost parameter is k
and the manager truthfully reports costs, all the patients have to be treated and profits are equal to
p − k − 1/2 ≥ 0. The manager has no incentives to misreports costs. Ex ante, the investment in cost
reduction is made if and only if
e¯
(
p− k− 1
2
)
≥ S ⇐⇒ p ≥ pˆ = k + 1
2
+
S
e
.
Remark that the minimal price necessary to elicit effort is indeed lower than k¯ if and only if S ≤
e∆k − e/2.
If p ∈ ]k¯, k¯ + 1/2], profits are equal to zero if the cost parameter turns out to be k¯. In case of low
costs, if the manager truthfully reports the cost realization, profits are equal to (p− k− 1/2). If the
manager mimics the high cost type, the profit is equal to 2∆k(p − k¯). Truthfully reporting the cost
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parameter is thus incentive compatible if and only if the difference between these two profits is positive:
p− k− 1
2
− 2∆k(p− k¯) ≥ 0.
which is always true if ∆k > 1/2. Ex ante, the hospital exerts effort if and only if
e
(
p− 1
2
− k
)
− S ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ p ≥ pˆ = k + 1
2
+
S
e
.
The minimal price necessary to exert effort is lower than k¯ + 1/2 for any S ≤ e∆k.
Finally, if p > k¯ + 1/2 the private hospital will treat all patients in case of high and low costs. Thus,
the private manager does not have any incentive to misreport the realization of costs. Ex ante, the
hospital exerts effort if and only if
p− ek− (1− e)k¯ − 1
2
− S ≥ p− k¯ − 1
2
⇐⇒ S ≤ e∆k,
which is always the case under assumption 1. Thus, the minimal price eliciting effort is always smaller
than k¯ + 1/2.
Summarizing, the private manager always reports truthfully. He exerts effort for any price greater or
equal to pˆ = k + 1/2 + S/e.
Proof of Proposition 7
To prove the proposition, we have to compare , HE(pMIX) and HE(pMND).
• If ∆k ≤ 1/2, we know from Proposition 5 that pMND = 0 and expected health expenditures if the
no-dumping constraint is enforced are equal to k¯+1/2. Thus, setting the hospital free to refuse patients
is optimal whenever pMIX > 0 This is true for any e(∆k)2/2 < S ≤ S¯.
• If ∆k > 1/2 and the no-dumping constraint is enforced, expected health expenditure are equal to
HE(pMND) = k¯ + 1/2 + S − e¯∆k. HE(pMIX) depend on the efficiency of managerial effort.
If S > S¯, then pMIX = 0 and HE(pMIX) = k¯ + 1/2 ≥ HE(pMND).
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If S ≤ e¯(∆k)2/2, then pMIX = k¯ and from equation (6) we have:
HE(pMIX) = k¯ +
1
2
− e (∆k)
2
2
,
which is greater than HE(pMND) for any S ≤ e¯(∆k)2/2.
If e(∆k)2/2 < S ≤ e(∆k)2 (√e¯+ 1/2) ≤ e(∆k − (∆k)2/2), then pMIX = p˜ and from equation (7) we
have:
HE(pMIX) =
(
S
e∆k
− ∆k
2
)2
− e(∆k)
2
2
+ k¯ +
1
2
.
which is greater than HE(pMND) for any S ≤ e(∆k − (∆k)2/2).
Finally, if e
(
∆k − (∆k)2/2) < S ≤ e (∆k − (1 +√e)−2/2), then pMIX = p˜ and from equation (8) we
have
HE(pMIX) = 1 + k¯ −
√
2
(
e∆k − S
e
)
+ (1− e¯)
(
e∆k − S
e
)
.
This expression is greater than HE(pMND) if and only if
1
2
−
√
A+
1
2
(1− e)A ≥ S − e∆k,
where A = 2(e∆k − S)/e. The inequality can then be rewritten as 1 − 2√A + A ≥ 0. This is true
whenever A ≤ 1. Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for HE(pMIX) ≥ HE(pMND) is:
2(e∆k − S)/e ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ S ≥ e∆k − e
2
.
This condition is always satisfied when S > e
(
∆k − (∆k)2/2) since ∆k < 1.
Summarizing, if the efficiency gain related to the effort in cost reduction is relatively high (∆k > 1/2),
then it is optimal for the regulator to impose a no-dumping constraint on the private firm.
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